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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
R. G. CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of possession of an explosive 
device, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 (1995); 
possession or use of methamphetamine in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998); possession or use of marijuana, a 
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998); and 
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(a) (1998).* This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
Sections 76-10-306 and 58-37-8 were amended subsequent to this offense. 
However, the amendments are irrelevant to this appeal. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-
306 (Supp. 1997) and 58-37-8 (1998). 
CaseNo.980017-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This case presents the sole issue of whether the trial court correctly permitted one 
of the State's witnesses to testify about (1) the explosive nature of the device found on 
defendant, and (2) a "test" the witness conducted on the powder in the device, given the 
fact that defendant had notice two months before trial that the witness would testify, and 
the fact that the trial court excluded from trial any reference to testing the witness did 
because defendant received no notice of it. 
The decision to admit or exclude testimony for failure to adhere to discovery 
obligations lies within the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on 
appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Begishe. 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App 
1997). An abuse of discretion occurs where, after careful evaluation of all relevant 
factors, the trial court's ruling is deemed to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the 
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief, 
including: Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1995); 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. 
(Copies of these items are attached in addendum A.) 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with four counts stemming from events 
occurring on December 27, 1996, in Utah County: possession of an explosive device, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 (1995); possession or 
use of methamphetamine in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998); possession or use of marijuana, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998); and unlawful 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37a-5(a)(1998)(R. 1-2). 
A trial was held on November 12, 1997, following which the jury convicted 
defendant as charged (R. 81-85).2 The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms 
of one-to-fifteen years at the Utah State Prison for each of the first two counts, and 1 year 
for each of the third and fourth counts, suspended the sentences and placed defendant on 
thirty-six months probation (R. 87-88). Defendant filed a timely appeal, challenging the 
trial court's ruling on the motion he filed during the trial to exclude the testimony of one 
of the State's witnesses. 
defendant's appeal presents an issue related only to the conviction of possession 
of an explosive device. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Alligator Park near Utah Lake in Provo, Utah, is a public facility that has an 11 
p.m. curfew (R. 102/58). Officer Erik Knutzen was on routine patrol in the area at 3:14 
a.m. on December 27, 1996, when he saw a red pick-up truck driving slowly through the 
large parking lot in the dark (R. 102/58-59). The driver's window on the truck was down, 
and the driver waived as the officer's car approached him (R. 102/59). The officer pulled 
behind the truck, turned on his spotlight, and approached the driver's side of the truck (R. 
102/59). He found defendant behind the wheel and his fourteen-year-old son in the front 
passenger's seat (R. 102/69, 78). 
Defendant handed the officer his driver's license with his left hand while holding 
another object in his right hand (R. 102/59). That object was three inches long, XA inch in 
diameter, and wrapped in aluminum foil with an eight-inch-long fuse protruding from one 
end (R. 102/59-60, 89-90). The officer asked defendant what it was, and defendant 
claimed that it was a "firecracker" (R. 102/60). The officer then asked if it was "a real 
explosive device," to which defendant responded it was "a 30.06 shell with some 
gunpowder inside of i f (R. 102/60). 
The officer believed it to be a dangerous item and asked defendant to give it to him 
(R. 102/60). When defendant did so, the officer was able to see inside the truck beyond 
defendant and saw, in plain view between the front seats, three larger items, each 
approximately one foot long, "a lot thicker" than the first device-nearing the size of "a 
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full stick of dynamiter-wrapped in aluminum foil, with a fuse sticking out of each (R. 
102/61). The officer's previous experience with explosives had taught him that dynamite 
is unstable and a homemade explosive is worse, so he immediately ordered defendant 
away from the truck and called for backup (R. 102/61, 81, 90). 
Within a few minutes, Officers Mark Jackson and Ann Richey arrived (R. 102/61-
62). Officer Knutzen told defendant he was under arrest, then had Officer Richey search 
defendant for weapons while Knutzen searched the truck (R. 102/62, 70). Officer Richey 
discovered an aspirin container in defendant's pants pocket in which she found a small 
plastic baggie containing what defendant confirmed to be methamphetamine residue and 
prescription drugs (R. 102/62-66, 85-86, 92-93). 
In the meantime, Officer Knutzen searched the truck and found a velvet case under 
the driver's seat containing a spoon with burn marks on it and a syringe, both of which 
contained methamphetamine residue (R. 102/67-68). He also found a small baggie of 
marijuana in the console between the front seats (R. 102/69). Elsewhere in the truck, he 
found a bank bag, a bag of blasting caps with fuses, and a "shelf (R. 102/75. 106). 
Officer Knutzen then requested that defendant be searched more thoroughly (R. 
102/69-70). Officer Jackson conducted the second search of defendant and found a small 
Polident tube in his coat pocket (R. 102/70, 98-99, 98-99). The tube was rolled up from 
the bottom around a small plastic baggie (R. 102/70-72, 98-99). Defendant was asked if 
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the baggie contained methamphetamine, and he said, "Yes, I think so. I bought it with the 
idea that it was meth." (R. 102/71-72, 100). 
Having found what he believed to be explosives and blasting caps with fuses, 
Officer Knutzen requested that Officer Brad Leatham be called (R. 102/74-75). As 
commander of the bomb squad, Officer Leatham was required to respond and supervise 
any investigation dealing with explosives (R. 102/103). Officer Leatham later 
disassembled the item identified by defendant as a firecracker and found that it was in 
fact a bullet casing WTapped in aluminum foil and containing smokeless powder with a 
fuse tightly crimped both to the top of the shell and to blasting caps (R. 102/105-06, 113-
15, 124, 129).3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Defendant claims error in the trial court's admission of Officer Leatham's 
testimony concerning the explosive nature of the device taken from defendant because the 
prosecutor allegedly failed to give defendant the pre-trial notice required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-17-13 (1995). His claim that the trial court should have granted a continuance 
3Officer Leatham apparently conducted a number of tests on the device (R. 
102/143). However, the trial court granted defendant's motion to exclude any testimony 
about the testing because defendant was "not given any opportunity to be present [at] or 
to be aware" of the testing (R. 102/143). Nothing in the record on appeal sheds any light 
on the number, type, or outcome of the testing. The officer's opinion at trial that the 
device would explode and produce shrapnel was presented as being based solely on his 
experience, expertise, and observations in matters wholly unrelated to this case. There is 
nothing in the record to suggest that the opinion arose from specific testing of this device. 
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is not properly before this Court because defendant expressly told the trial court that he 
did not want that relief His claim that he had no notice that Officer Leatham would give 
his expert opinion at trial that the device would explode and would produce shrapnel is 
without merit because he was aware from the preliminary hearing two months before trial 
of the State's reliance on Officer Leatham's testimony and of the general content of that 
testimony. Despite the prosecutor's failure to provide defendant with the officer's 
curriculum vitae or a written report of his anticipated testimony, defendant had ample 
opportunity prior to trial to enlist the trial court's help in obtaining additional information 
he felt was necessary or to mitigate the anticipated prejudice from the testimony. His 
failure to do so undermines his claim of surprise and prejudice. Moreover, even assuming 
error occurred, it was harmless given the remaining unchallenged testimony about the 
components of the device, the dangerous nature of the blasting caps, the way the 
components were put together, and the officer's experience with numerous similar 
devices in the past. 
Further, any error in the admission of testimony that Officer Leatham lighted the 
powder in the device to verify his initial determination that it was smokeless gunpowder 
was harmless where the testimony added little, if anything, to the case given the fact that 
the officer testified that he had already unquestionably identified the powder before 
conducting the simple verification. 
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EXPERT TESTIMONY 
WHERE DEFENDANT HAD ADEQUATE PRE-TRIAL NOTICE TO MEET 
THE TESTIMONY OR TO MITIGATE ANY PREJUDICE ARISING 
THEREFROM BUT DID NEITHER; ALTERNATIVELY, ANY ERROR IN 
ADMISSION OF THE TESTIMONY WAS HARMLESS 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed Officer Brad 
Leatham to testify as an expert witness on behalf of the State. Specifically, he claims that 
some of Leatham*s testimony should have been excluded because of the State's alleged 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(a)(1) (1995), which requires that the prosecutor 
provide pre-trial notice to defendant of any expert testimony he will offer at trial. Br. of 
Aplt. at 8-10. Further, he claims that the trial court erroneously denied his request for a 
continuance to meet the testimony. Id. at 2, 7. However, defendant's claim of error fails 
on both counts. 
A. Standard of Appellate Review and Trial Court Ruling: 
The decision of whether to bar testimony for a party's failure to adhere to 
discovery obligations is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and an appellate 
court reviews the decision for a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 
529-30 (Utah App. 1997) (noting also that in the absence of much judicial interpretation 
of section 77-17-13, an appellate court should look to cases involving prosecutorial 
violations of discovery responsibilities under rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure). 
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An abuse of discretion occurs when, after careful evaluation of all relevant factors, the 
denial can be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Id at 530; see also United States v. 
Flvnt 756 F.2d 1352, 1358, opinion amended bv 764 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1985). 
The parties initially addressed this matter below in an unrecorded bench 
conference the day of trial (R. 102/41, 102). Defendant made a record of his objection 
after Officer Brad Leatham completed his testimony and the jury had been excused (R. 
102/139-44) (a copy of the argument is attached as addendum B). The trial court opened 
the discussion by noting that it had previously heard the objection, had denied defendant's 
motion, and "would allow the witness to testify" (R. 102/139). Add. B. Following 
argument, the court elaborated that it had earlier granted defendant's motion, in part, by 
excluding from trial any testimony involving "[a]ny tests which the witness may have 
conducted relative to this particular device" because defendant was "not given any 
opportunity to be present or to be aware" (R. 102/143) (a copy of the trial court's ruling 
is included in addendum B). The court elaborated: 
Well, as indicated, counsel, the Court is of the opinion the statute [§ 77-17-
13] is intended to give notice. The fact that the witness had previously testified 
without objection certainly gives indication that you were aware of the testimony 
of the witness. 
(R. 102/143).4 Add. B. 
4The trial court had some concern that Officer Leatham in fact testified as an 
expert. Although the court assumed, for purposes of defendant's motion, that expert 
testimony was involved, it voiced its believe that the testimony was based on experience 
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B. This Court Need Not Address Defendant's Claim Of Error In The Denial Of A 
Continuance As Defendant Expressly Denied Seeking Such Relief Below: 
Any claim that the trial court denied defendant's request for a continuance is not 
properly before this Court because defendant failed to request such relief below. See 
State v. Larson. 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989) (failure to request a continuance 
essentially waives the right to later claim error in the trial court's ruling on a discovery 
issue); State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988) (failure to make timely efforts to 
mitigate or eliminate the prejudice caused by the discovery violation waives the right to 
relief). First, defense counsel told the court below, "We're not asking for a continuance 
of the trial. We're asking that this witness be precluded from testifying because we didn't 
receive notice." (R. 102/142-43). Add. B. Second, despite the fact that defendant knew 
at least two months prior to trial not only that Officer Leatham would likely testify at trial 
but also the basic substance of the testimony (R. 102/142-43), defendant took no steps to 
inform the Court of the prosecutor's failure to identify his trial witnesses or to require the 
Court to order the release of the officer's curriculum vitae or a summary of his testimony. 
Instead, defendant waited until the day of trial and sought only exclusion of the witness' 
testimony. Defendant's failure to take available, less drastic steps to mitigate any 
prejudice in the face of his reasonable knowledge of the testimony prevents him from 
obtaining the requested relief on appeal. See Griffiths. 752 P.2d at 883; State v. 
"which almost any police officer or other person might well have" (R. 102/144). Add. B. 
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Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990) (failure to ask for any but the 
harshest of remedies when faced with unexpected evidence precludes a claim of error on 
appeal); see also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) ("[A] party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error/'). Accordingly, this Court need not address this claim. 
£ . Alternatively, The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Permitting The 
Officer To Testify As An Expert: 
Section 77-17-13 provides: 
(l)(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in a 
felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing, the party 
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as 
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing. 
Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's curriculum 
vitae, and a copy of the expert's report. 
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed 
testimony. If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately 
inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony including any 
opinion and the bases and reasons of that opinion, the party intending to call the 
expert shall provide to the opposing party a written explanation of the expert's 
anticipated testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to 
prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the 
expert when available. 
Add. A. 
Defendant contends that because he never received written notice that Officer 
Leatham would testify or any of the other written information referenced by the statute, 
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Officer Leatham should not have been permitted to testify that the device found in 
defendant's hand would explode and produce shrapnel. Br. of Aplt. at 8, 10. 
Nothing in the statute requires that the entirety of the notice be given in writing. 
The prosecutor in fact provided notice of Officer Leatham's status as an expert and the 
expected substance of his anticipated testimony when he had Officer Leatham testify at 
the preliminary hearing two months before trial. The only witnesses at that hearing were 
Officer Leatham and the arresting officer (R. 11). Although the prosecutor should have 
followed up with the written material referenced in the statute, his failure to do so under 
the facts at hand does not warrant reversal. The giving of notice two months prior to trial 
necessarily comports with the statute's requirement that notice must be given uas soon as 
practicable" but at least thirty days before trial. In this case, defendant cannot claim 
surprise from the officer's trial testimony because he received notice which included both 
the existence and the content of Officer Leatham's testimony (R. 102/142). Officer 
Leatham testified, without objection, at the preliminary hearing, and his testimony 
included roughly the same information elicited from him at trial (R. 102/142).D 
Consequently, defendant was on reasonable notice that Officer Leatham not only would 
5Defendant did not include a transcript of the preliminary hearing as part of the 
record on appeal. Accordingly, this Court must assume the regularity of the proceeding 
and that it conformed to the undisputed representations about it made on the record 
below. See Christofferson, 793 P.2d at 946-47 (u; When crucial matters are not included 
in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court.'") 
(quoting State v. Theison. 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985)). 
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testify at trial, but, as an explosives officer, would testify about the explosive nature of the 
device in defendant's possession consistently with his preliminary hearing testimony. To 
assume anything less would be unreasonable. 
Neither was the defendant robbed of the opportunity to have an expert testify as to 
the non-explosive nature of the device. Defendant knew from the time the charges were 
filed that the explosiveness of the device he possessed would be at issue, and he knew the 
basic content of the officer's testimony as of the preliminary hearing. This gave him 
ample time to investigate the defense theory that the item did not qualify as an explosive. 
His failure to do so should not be laid at the prosecutor's feet merely because a written 
report or curriculum vitae was not provided to defendant. 
Despite the advance notice, nothing suggests that defendant ever took steps to 
compel the prosecutor to reveal any additional information, either by direct contact with 
the prosecutor or by resort to the trial court over the next two months. Instead, he waited 
until trial, then sought to have the witness' testimony excluded. Defense counsel "has 
an affirmative duty to make a reasonable investigation^]" State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 
143 (Utah 1994), and he had sufficient information and ample time within which to 
investigate the explosive nature of the device prior to trial or to seek whatever additional 
information he felt he needed. His failure to timely act does not warrant a determination 
that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to exclude from trial Officer 
Leatham's testimony about the explosiveness of the device. 
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Defendant relies on two cases to argue that reversal is warranted under these 
circumstances. However, both are distinguishable from the facts at hand. Defendant cites 
State v. Kallin. 877 P.2d 138 (Utah 1994), as authority for excluding the expert testimony 
and the act of lighting the powder based on a violation of section 77-17-13. Br. of Aplt. 
at 6, 9. However, Kallin never mentions section 77-17-13. Instead, the opinion 
references only the trial court's pre-trial order directing disclosure of the parties' expert 
witnesses and the content of their testimony. Id at 142. Moreover, not only did 
defendant in Kallin fail to disclose to the prosecutor that the proposed expert would say 
that defendant was not a pedophile, but questioning of the expert outside the jury's 
presence suggested that the expert was not prepared to give that testimony. Id at 141-2 & 
n.4. 
Defendant also relies on State v. Begishe. 937 P.2d 527 (Utah App. 1997), as 
authority for his claim that a continuance or exclusion of the testimony was warranted. In 
Begishe, this Court held that the trial court erroneously denied defendant's request to 
exclude expert testimony and related test results or to continue the proceedings to permit 
defendant to meet the evidence where the prosecutor had not provided the notice required 
by section 77-17-13(l)(a). Id at 531-32. However, Begishe differs from the case at hand 
on three points. First, unlike defendant herein, defense counsel in Begishe sought a 
continuance in the trial court, thereby providing a basis for the appellate court's holding 
that the trial court "at a minimum was required to grant a continuance of reasonable 
14 
duration.v Id. at 532. Second, counsel in Begishe also verified the day before trial her 
belief that no additional testing had been done; defense counsel in this case made no such 
effort. Id. at 528. Third, the appellate court expressly recognized that the prosecutor's 
violation in Begishe was "uniquely egregious": the prosecutor unjustifiably waited until 
noon on the first day of trial to send certain evidence to the state crime lab for testing, 
with the result that defense counsel began trial with the reassurance she received from the 
state crime lab the day before trial that no testing beyond that already known to counsel 
had been done. Id. at 528-29. The prosecutor's delayed action led defense counsel to 
believe that there was no physical evidence corroborating the charges against defendant. 
Id. at 530. In contrast, defense counsel in this case had two months notice as to the fact 
and content of Officer Leathanf s testimony, and he successfully excluded from trial 
evidence of the officer's testing of the device. 
Given these significant differences, neither Kallin nor Begishe are persuasive 
authority. 
Consequently, neither case is controlling authority given the circumstances in this 
case. 
P . Reversal Is Not Warranted Where Defendant Suffered No Prejudice From The 
Absence Of A Curriculum Vitae Or Written Report Of Officer Leathanf s 
Testimony: 
Even assuming, arguendo, that error occurred in the trial court's admission of 
Officer Leatham's testimony, reversal is not warranted because the admission of the 
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testimony amounted to no more than harmless error. "An error is harmful if, 'absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome' for the defendant, or 
'our confidence in the verdict is undermined.'" State v. Perez, 946 P.2d 724, 728 (Utah 
App. 1997) (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09). 
Defendant complains that he had no reason to know that Officer Leatham would 
give expert testimony that the device could explode, and that he had no time to meet the 
testimony with his own expert. Br. of Aplt. at 7-10. However, he knew as of two months 
prior to trial that the State would rely in large part on Officer Leatham's testimony and 
what the basic content of that testimony was going to be. See point IC, supra. 
Defendant's assertion that he could have found an expert to say that the device "would in 
fact not explode" is made without any support, and is extremely doubtful in light of the 
fact that the explosive nature of the device is a necessary element of one of the charges, 
and use of such testimony would have been in defendant's best interest even absent the 
challenged testimony from Officer Leatham. Br. of Aplt. at 9-10. However, defendant 
failed to advance such testimony below. 
Moreover, even without the challenged expert opinion that the device in 
defendant's control would explode and that the metal casing would produce shrapnel, 
there was sufficient evidence to establish the explosive nature of the device to support the 
jury's verdict on the charge of possession of an explosive device, rendering it unlikely 
that the outcome would have been more favorable for defendant. There were four devices 
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found in defendant's truck: one in his hand, three more between the driver and the 
passenger seats (R. 120/59-60). Defendant was holding what he called a "firecracker," 
and he described it to the arresting officer as being "a 30.06 shell with some gunpowder 
inside of it" (R. 102/60). Officer Leatham testified that the device consisted of a metal 
casing (a bullet) containing smokeless powder wrapped in aluminum foil with a neck 
tightly crimped on a fuse which in turn was crimped to blasting caps (R. 102/105-06, 114-
15, 124, 129). Other testimony established that the powder found in firecrackers was 
different than the powder found in this device (R. 102/90). Officer Leatham testified that 
he had seen similar devices in the past explode numerous times (R. 102/128-30). He said 
that it is the blasting caps that cause the explosion, and that the caps used in this case 
were "extremely forceful and hazardous" and could go off if dropped and stomped on (R. 
102/107-09, 122). He noted that the blasting cap alone is probably more than three times 
as volatile as a firecracker (R. 121-22), and that any one of the blasting caps taken from 
defendant's car could take someone's hand apart, cause serious physical injury or death, 
and blow a coffee can ten or fifteen feet into the air, making a sieve of the can (R. 107, 
121-22, 136). This evidence amply supports a determination that defendant's device was 
explosive and renders it highly unlikely that defendant would have had a more favorable 
result absent the express testimony that the device was in fact explosive and would 
produce shrapnel. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted. 
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E. Any Error In Admitting Testimony That The Officer Lit Some Of The Powder In 
The Device To Verify His Conclusion As To The Type Of Powder Was Harmless: 
Defendant appears to fault the trial court's ruling on testing done by Officer 
Leatham, suggesting that he was prejudiced by admission of testimony about one such 
test because the untimely notice of the tests given on the first day of trial rendered him 
unable to obtain his own expert to participate in or conduct separate tests. Br. of Aplt. at 
11. 
The trial court excluded from trial any testimony from Officer Leatham involving 
*'[a]ny tests which the witness may have conducted relative to this particular device" 
because defendant was "not given any opportunity to be present or to be aware" (R. 
102/143). Add. B. Defendant appears to claim on appeal what he claimed below: that 
Officer Leatham's testimony at trial about lighting the powder found in the device 
constituted inadmissible "testing" testimony (R. 102/144).6 The officer made no other 
mention in his testimony below of testing done in regard to the device at issue.7 
6The trial judge erroneously responded that he believed that some of that testimony 
was the result of defense questioning (R. 102/144). Add. B. However, the testimony 
came out during the prosecutor's direct examination of the witness, and defendant 
unsuccessfully objected to it (R. 102/115). 
7Defendant does not claim that the officer's opinion that the device would explode 
constituted inadmissible "testing" testimony. The officer's opinion was based on his 
experience, training and observations of other testing conducted in unrelated matters prior 
to this case. Defendant's apparent claim concerning admission of testing evidence relates 
solely to the lighting of the powder inside the device for verification purposes. 
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Officer Leatham testified that when he took the device apart, he found smokeless 
powder, and that "[t]here was no question in my mind that it was smokeless powder" (R. 
102/115). He thereafter verified his finding of the type of powder by lighting a small part 
of it to see how, not if, it burned (R. 102/115). This Court need not determine whether 
admission of the testimony constituted error because assuming, arguendo, that error 
occurred, it was harmless. State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1993) (where a 
claimed error is harmless, the appellate court need not determine whether error in 
fact occurred). 
The officer testified that by lighting the powder, he merely verified what he had 
already conclusively found—the powder in the device was a smokeless powder (R. 
102/115). Where the officer had already stated, without objection, his absolute certainty 
that the device contained smokeless powder, he based that determination on his 
experience and observations, and that determination supported the remainder of his 
testimony, it is highly unlikely that without mention of the fact that he lit the powder for 
verification, the jury would have rendered a verdict more favorable to defendant. Perez, 
946 P.2d at 728. The mere absence of this single act of verification is not reasonably 
likely to undermine the credibility of the witness to the point that the jury would have 
rejected his findings. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ifr day of July, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
^ 7 ^ 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
76-10-306. Definitions — Persons exempted — Penalties 
for possession, use, or removal of explosives, 
chemical, or incendiary devices and possession 
of components. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary device" means: 
(i) dynamite and all other forms of high explosives, including water 
gel, slurry, military C-4 (plastic explosives), blasting agents to include 
nitro-carbon-nitrate, ammonium nitrate, fuel oil mixtures, cast prim-
ers and boosters, R.D.X., P.E.T.N., electric and nonelectric blasting 
caps, exploding cords commonly called detonating cord, detcord, or 
primacord, picric acid explosives, T.N.T. and T.N.T. mixtures, nitro-
glycerin and nitroglycerin mixtures, or any other chemical mixture 
intended to explode with fire or force; 
(ii) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile, or similar device; and 
(iii) any incendiary bomb, grenade, fire bomb, chemical bomb, or 
similar device, including any device, except kerosene lamps, if crimi-
nal intent has not been established, which consists of or includes a 
breakable container including a flammable liquid or compound and a 
wick composed of any material which, when ignited, is capable of 
igniting the flammable liquid or compound or any breakable container 
which consists of, or includes a chemical mixture that explodes with 
fire or force and can be carried, thrown, or placed. 
(b) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary device" shall not include rifle, 
pistol, or shotgun ammunition. 
(c) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts" means any substances or 
materials or combinations which have been prepared or altered for use in 
the creation of an explosive, chemical, or incendiary device. These sub-
stances or materials include: 
(i) timing device, clock, or watch which has been altered in such a 
manner as to be used as the arming device in an explosive; 
(ii) pipe, end caps, or metal tubing which has been prepared for a 
pipe bomb; and 
(iii) mechanical timers, mechanical triggers, chemical time delays, 
electronic time delays, or commercially made or improvised items 
which, when used singly or in combination, may be used in the 
construction of a timing delay mechanism, booby trap, or activating 
mechanism for any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device. 
(d) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts" shall not include rifle, 
pistol, or shotgun ammunition, or any signaling device customarily used in 
operation of railroad equipment. 
(2) The provisions in Subsections (3) and (6) shall not apply to: 
(a) any public safety officer while acting in his official capacity trans-
porting or otherwise handling explosives, chemical, or incendiary devices; 
(b) any member of the armed forces of the United States or Utah 
National Guard while acting in his official capacity; 
(c) any person possessing a valid permit issued under the provisions of 
Uniform Fire Code, Article 77, or any employee of such permittee acting 
within the scope of his employment; 
(d) any person possessing a valid license as an importer, wholesaler, or 
display operator under the provisions of the Utah Fireworks Act, Sections 
11-3-3.2 and 11-3-3.5; and 
(e) any person or entity possessing or controlling an explosive, chemi-
cal, or incendiary device as part of its lawful business operations. 
(3) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesses or 
controls an explosive, chemical, or incendiary device is guilty of a felony of the 
second degree. 
(4) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly: 
(a) uses or causes to be used an explosive, chemical, or incendiary 
device in the commission of or an attempt to commit a felony; or 
(b) injures another or attempts to injure another in his person or 
property through the use of an explosive, chemical, or incendiary device, is 
guilty of a felony of the first degree. 
(5) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly removes or 
causes to be removed or carries away any explosive, chemical, or incendiary 
device from the premises where said explosive, chemical, or incendiary device 
is kept by the lawful user, vendor, transporter, or manufacturer without the 
consent or direction of the lawful possessor is guilty of a felony of the second 
degree. 
(6) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesses any 
explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
History: C. 1953,76-10-306, enacted by L. present section, effective May 3, 1993. 
1993, ch. 75, S 1. Compiler's Notes. — Section 11-3-3.2, cited 
Repeals and Reenactmenta. — Laws in Subsection (2Xd), was renumbered in 1993 
1993, ch. 75, $ 1 repeals former $ 76-10-306, as *, $ 53-7-223 to be part of the Fire Prevention 
enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 196, $ 76-10-306,
 a n ( j Fireworks Act. 
defining "infernal machine," and enacts the 
THE JUDGMENT 77-17-13 
77-17-13. Expert testimony generally — Notice require-
ments. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify 
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing, 
the party intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing 
party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten 
days before the hearing. Notice shall include the name and address of the 
expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report. 
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed 
testimony. If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not 
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed 
testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that 
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing 
party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient 
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the 
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when 
available. 
(2) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party 
receiving notice shall provide notice to the other party of witnesses whom the 
party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the name 
and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. If 
available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided. If the rebuttal 
expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately inform 
concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony, or in the event the 
rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the rebuttal 
witness shall provide a written explanation of the witness's anticipated 
rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to 
prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by any 
rebuttal expert when available. 
(3) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this 
section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or 
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. If the court finds 
that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad faith on the part 
of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions. 
History: C. 1953, 77-17-13, enacted by L. became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to 
1994, ch. 139, § 3. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 139 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information 
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
(0 Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery 
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make 
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be 
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continu-
ance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and 
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of 
the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the 
foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance 
shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear 
or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for 
consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused 
and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem 
appropriate. 
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MR. GALE: No objection. 
THE COURT: Very well. Thank you for coming 
Youfll be excused. 
We're going to recess now for lunch, and 
we'll reconvene at 1:30. We have a few matters to 
take care of now. 
And during the time of recess do not discuss 
the case among yourselves, nor permit anyone else to 
discuss the case with you. Have no conversations on 
any topic with the attorneys, parties, or witnesses. 
And we'll be in recess until 1:30. 
(The following proceedings were 
held in open court after the jury 
left the courtroom:) 
THE COURT: Okay, counsel, the Court had 
previously heard your argument relative to allowing 
this particular witness to testify and advised you 
that I was denying your motion and would allow the 
witness to testify and have told you you can preserve 
for the record your objection until this time. So go 
ahead. 
MR. GALE: Judge, if I may --
THE COURT: You can be seated. I'm sorry. 
I meant them, not you, counsel. 
MR. GALE: If I may, Judge, I would just be 
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objecting on a few grounds. First, that Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure 77-17-13 requires that the 
prosecution give us 30 days notice prior to calling an 
expert, that they present us with a curriculum vitae 
of the expert, and also that they give us a copy of 
the expert's report. 
And so we would be objecting that we did not 
receive any of this from the prosecution. In fact, 
the prosecution was ordered last week at the pretrial 
to provide a witness list. We never received a 
witness list. They indicated that they felt like they 
gave us notice at the preliminary hearing by calling 
this witness at the preliminary hearing. However, I 
believe that the statute indicates that they should 
give us notice 30 days before trial or ten days before 
any hearing. And so I would think that that 
anticipates notice before a preliminary hearing, also 
notice before a trial. 
Also, in the case of State vs. Calin, the 
State was aware that the defense was going to call an 
expert, similar to this case, that the defense failed 
to give the proper notice in compliance with the 
statute. Because they didn't comply with the statute, 
the defense was precluded from calling that expert. 
And we would think that the prosecution needs to be 
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held to the same standard. 
The State had the opportunity to give notice. 
The State knew that they were going to call this 
person at the time of the prelim. They knew last 
week, and they didn't actually give us notice until --
we didn't actually know until today that he was going 
to be an expert witness. And also they indicated to 
us today that he conducted tests, and we were not 
given any notice of those tests or any opportunity to 
participate or observe. 
If we would have had the opportunity, then we 
would have called our own expert, had our own expert 
examine the items and be able to bring our own 
testimony in as to the force or as to the explosive 
nature of these devices. 
And we think because notice wasn't given to 
us, that we didn't have an opportunity to observe, to 
examine his curriculum vitae, to examine any report 
prepared by him, that our client has been denied due 
process, and that the State has not complied with the 
rules, and that our client has been prejudiced because 
of this, and that expert testimony given by this 
person -- that we were not able to refute that because 
of the State's failure to give us notice. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jube. 
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MR. JUBE: Just initially in my own defense, 
frankly, I didn't know about this case until about 10 
days ago. So with regard to the notice of expert, I'm 
coming in a little bit late in the game. However, the 
irony of defense's argument is that they claim the 
State knew as soon as a week or more ago that they 
were going to call this witness. The bottom line fact 
is so did the defense. He testified at preliminary 
hearing. And to say -- he testified at the 
preliminary hearing and testified about these kinds of 
things. And then now to say they didn't have notice 
that we were going to call him and ask him to testify 
about these kinds of things, doesn't make any sense. 
I mean, the statute is designed to make sure 
no one is blind-sided with expert testimony that they 
don't even know might be a possibility. In this case, 
it wasn't just a possibility, it had already been done 
once at the prelim. 
I think under the circumstances to ask for a 
continuance of the trial and delay this even further 
is unwarranted. It's unnecessary and judicially 
inefficient. 
MR. GALE: And, Judge, that's not what we're 
asking for. We're not asking for a continuance of the 
trial. We're asking that this witness be precluded 
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from testifying because we didn't receive notice. 
And, Judge, the statute isn't just to help us 
not get blind-sided. The statute is to -- it requires 
that we get notice so that we can be provided with an 
opportunity to find out his credentials, find out 
exactly what tests he's done, and find out exactly 
what his testimony is going to be. It's not just to 
give us notice just saying, "We're calling an expert." 
It's to give us information so that we can determine 
whether we need to call our own expert. That was not 
done in this case. 
THE COURT: Well, as indicated, counsel, the 
Court is of the opinion the statute is intended to 
give notice. The fact that the witness had previously 
testified without objection certainly gives indication 
that you were aware of the testimony of the witness. 
Any tests which the witness may have 
conducted relative to this particular device, the 
Court excluded from testifying thereto because you 
were not given any opportunity to be present or to be 
aware. 
But as to his testimony, candidly, I'm not 
sure how much is expertise. The Court is assuming it 
is. As indicated, I've found that notice has been 
given as a practical matter. But the Court is of the 
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opinion that the testimony given is that of a person 
through experience which almost any police officer or 
other person might well have. And, therefore, as an 
expert, itfs a pretty low-level expertise. 
MR. GALE: Judge --
THE COURT: I've made my ruling, 
MR. GALE: Just briefly, Judge. I'd just 
like to note that it wasn't excluded -- the 
information that he like tested this powder, the 
powder from this particular device, to make sure it 
was flammable, he actually did testify that he did 
perform that test. And the Court allowed that. 
THE COURT: I think some of those questions 
were a result of your questions, counsel. 
All right. We're going to be in recess until 
1:30. 
(Lunch recess taken.) 
(The following proceedings were 
held in open court in the presence 
of the jury:) 
THE COURT: Be seated, please. The record 
may show that the jury is all present. Counsel for 
the State and counsel for the defendant and defendant 
are present. 
You may call your next witness. 
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